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A SMALL AMOUNT OF CHANGE FOR THE GOOD OF THE CHILDREN:
REPLACING THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
WITH THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2005, South Carolina State Senators Hayes and Richardson
introduced a bill proposing that South Carolina enact the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). 1 Adopting this proposed law
would repeal South Carolina's law on child custody jurisdiction-the South
Carolina Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 2 (SCUCCJA). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), a body of
legal practitioners and scholars appointed by state governments to research,
draft, and promote the enactment of uniform state laws where uniformity is both
desirable and practical, drafted both the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act 3 (UCCJA) and the UCCJEA. € The main purpose of both uniform acts is to
further the best interests of children involved in child custody disputes by
hearing and resolving child custody disputes quickly, fairly, and efficiently. 5 The
UCCJA and the UCCJEA accomplish this by preventing multiple child custody
hearings in multiple states because they cause confusion, prolong a child
custody dispute, and damage the family as a whole, especially the child in
question. The NCCUSL drafted the UCCJEA specifically to revise the UCCJA,
which had been adopted by all fifty states.6
Replacing the UCCJA with the UCCJEA would have very little impact on
the way South Carolina handles child custody disputes because South Carolina
case law on child custody jurisdiction and enforcement is already in line with the
UCCJEA. The UCCJEA combines the UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA),7 a federal statute enacted in 1980 to prevent parents
from taking their children across state lines to find a favorable forum for child
custody disputes.' Since the PKPA is a federal statute, South Carolina case law

1. S. 139, 116th Gen. Assem.. 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005), availableathttp://www.scstatehouse.net/
sess 116 2005-2006/bills/139.htm.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (1976).
3. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1 28, 9 U.L.A. 271 647 (1999).
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, About NCCUSL
http://www.nccusl.org/update/desktopdefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=9 (last visited May 16, 2007).
5. The prefatory notes ofeach act address the need for uniform laws in custody disputes. See UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT prefatory n.. 9 U.L.A. 262-65 (1999): UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT prefatory n.. 9 U.L.A. 649-53 (1999).
6. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act http://www.nccusl.org/
update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp (last visited May 7, 2007).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 6. 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
8. Id. § 7, 94 Stat. at 3568-69; see Kelly Gaines Stoner, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
& Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) A Metamorphosis of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA). 75 N.D. L. REV. 301, 305 (1999).
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already incorporates the PKPA into its interpretation of the SCUCCJA. 9
Adopting the UCCJEA would simply make South Carolina law on child custody
jurisdiction more precise and reliable and bring South Carolina up to par with
the rest of the nation forty-four states, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have already adopted the UCCJEA.10 Thus, because enacting the
UCCJEA would not have created any major changes requiring extensive
research and debate by the state legislature and would further serve the best
interest of children, the passage of the UCCJEA in 2005 by the state legislature
would have seemed assured.
However, while the bill moved quickly through the Senate and arrived in the
House in April 2005, it never made it out of the House Judiciary Committee."
As a result, the House failed to pass the bill, and it could no longer be enacted
during the 116th legislative session. Fortunately, in November 2006, Senators
Hayes, Knotts, and Fair reintroduced the bill for the current legislative session,
but the legislative process starts over with each new two-year session. 12 While
the reason for the delay and eventual failure of the bill in the last legislative
session is unclear, the bill was probably the victim of politics: the House may
have lost sight of the bill among all the other legislation that came before it that
session. 3 This delay, however, has not cost South Carolina and its families with
respect to child custody disputes because together the SCUCCJA, the PKPA,
and South Carolina case law have the same effect on child custody jurisdiction
that the UCCJEA would have had. But the state legislature must still pass the
UCCJEA for several major reasons: it fixes the loopholes in the SCUCCJA, 14
provides stronger child custody decree enforcement measures, clarifies certain
aspects of the SCUCCJA by incorporating the PKPA, provides uniformity with
the rest of the states, and codifies what South Carolina case law already
provides. But most importantly, it serves the best interests of children. The main
purpose of both the SCUCCJA and the UCCJEA is to further the best interests
of children, and no state legislator wants his constituents to view him as ignoring
such an important policy.
Part 11 first provides background on the UCCJA, analyzes its major

9. See infra Part 11.B.
10. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 6.
11. See S. 139, 116th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2005). available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess 116 2005-2006/bills/139.htm.
12. See S. 13, 117th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl 17_2007-2008/bills/13.htm The bill was reintroduced in the South
Carolina Senate on January 9, 2007 and was passed by both chambers and signed by the governor.
becoming effective on June 8, 2007. Id. This Note was written and went to press several weeks before
S. 13 was passed, so the text has not been offered to reflect passage of the bill except indication in this
footnote.
13. See generally The South Carolina Bar. Legislative Update, http://www.scbar.org/
member/update2006.html (last visited May 16.2007) (providing a summary of all the major legislation
the South Carolina General Assembly passed in 2005, including, for example, the Tort Reform Act of
2005).
14. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the UCCJA's loopholes).
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provisions, and discusses the various loopholes in the Act that have allowed
child custody jurisdiction problems to persist. Part 11 then discusses the PKPA
and how it supplements and improves the UCCJA. The last section of Part 11
discusses the UCCJEA and describes how the UCCJEA combines the UCCJA
and the PKPA to solidify and establish truly uniform child custody jurisdiction
and enforcement laws in the United States. Part ITT provides a discussion of the
SCUCCJA and how South Carolina Courts have interpreted the SCUCCJA in
conjunction with the PKPA. Finally, this Note urges South Carolina to adopt the
UCCJEA because it will codify South Carolina case law on child custody
jurisdiction, make South Carolina law consistent with the rest of the nation, and
benefit children who are the subjects of child custody battles. The Appendix of
this Note contains a section-by-section comparison of the SCUCCJA, the
proposed UCCJEA, and the relevant PKPA provisions.
11.

THE HISTORY OF THE

A.

UCCJEA

AND ITS PREDECESSORS

Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct
1. Purpose of the Act

The NCCUSL created the UCCJA in 1968.15 The main purpose of the
UCCJA is to protect children involved in child custody disputes from two
traumatic events. The first event is when non-custodial parents kidnap their
children and take them to a different state to obtain a favorable forum for relitigating a child custody decree.16 Before the UCCJA, parental kidnapping was
a relatively common practice by parents who were divorced or in the process of
becoming divorced.' One parent would snatch the child from the other parent
and cross state lines, and the new state had to either respect the custody decree
of the original state or enter its own custody decree. 8 Usually the new state
would enter a new custody decree favoring the snatching parent while declining
"to accord full faith and credit to child custody decrees," creating multiple child
custody decrees in multiple states.' 9 The new state could enter a new decree
instead of honoring the original state's decree because the Supreme Court, when
considering the issue, had always failed to extend full faith and credit to custody
decrees.2" Thus, these multiple child custody decrees resulted in multi-state child
custody litigation and re-litigation, the second evil the UCCJA aimed to

15. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 261-647 (1999).
16. Id. § 1(a). 9 U.L.A. 271; see Stoner, supra note 8. at 302.
17. Wayne Young, Comment, ParentalChild-Snatching:Out ofa Ao-Man '-LandofLaw, 13 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 337,337 (1981) (quoting Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: InitialJurisdiction
and ContinuingJurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203, 203 (198 1)).
18. See id. at 338.
19. Jd. at 338 39.
20. Barbara Sheryl Silverman, Note, The Search for a Solution to ChildSnatching, 11 IHOFSTRA
L. REV. 1073, 1076 & n.24 (1983).
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eliminate because of its harmful effects on children and their development. 2
To protect children from these events, the UCCJA established rules
providing for initial jurisdiction, modification jurisdiction, emergency22
jurisdiction, and resolution of simultaneous proceedings in multiple states.
Unique to the UCCJA is that it only requires subject matter jurisdiction; the Act
does not require personal jurisdiction or the physical presence of the child or a
party to the proceeding for a state court to have jurisdiction over a child custody
case. 23 The UCCJA basically codifies Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in May
v. Anderson,24 which stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows one state
to recognize another state's child custody decree even if the original state did not
have personal jurisdiction over the child custody case.25 Instead of requiring
personal jurisdiction, the UCCJA appears to adopt footnote 30 of Shaffer v.
Heitner,26 which stands for the theory that adjudications of status are exceptions
to the minimum contacts requirement of personal jurisdiction; instead
adjudications of status involve in rem jurisdiction. 2' The UCCJA's lack of a
personal jurisdiction requirement allows states to efficiently hear and resolve
child custody disputes because the only other major requirements are subject
matter jurisdiction and all parties in the dispute having reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the court issues a decree. 28 Neither the United
States Supreme Court nor the South Carolina Supreme Court has considered the
UCCJA's lack of a personal jurisdiction requirement, but at least one state
supreme court found this does not violate an absent party's due process rights if
the parties comply with the notice provisions of the UCCJA.29
As a result of this unique aspect of the UCCJA, states can more readily
achieve their goal of granting exclusive jurisdiction to make the child custody
decree to the state most closely connected to the child and most able to protect
the interests of the child. It also encourages respect for the decree of another
state and cooperation among all states.3 °
2. Major Aspects
The UCCJA provides four major bases for both initial and modification
child custody jurisdiction: home state jurisdiction, significant connection

21. Stoner, supra note 8, at 302; see Young, supra note 17, at 337 38.
22. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, §§ 3. 6. 9 U.L.A. 307-08. 474-75 (1999).
23. Id. § 3(b), ©, 9 U.L.A. 308.
24. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
25. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring): see also McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 616
(W. Va. 1984) (discussing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in May and how the UCCJA was
based on this view).
26. 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
27. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d at 617.
28. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, § § 4. 5, 9 U.L.A. 458. 466 (1999).
29. See AM/cAtee, 323 S.E.2d at 617.
30. UNIT. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT prefatory n., 9 U.L.A. 264 65 (1999); see Young,
supra note 17, at 341-42.
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jurisdiction, emergency jurisdiction, and vacuum jurisdiction. 31 Home state
jurisdiction means the following:
[The] State (1) is the home state of the child at the time of
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from [the] State because of his removal or retention by a
person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in this State ... 32
A state has significant connection jurisdiction if "(1) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection
with [the] State, and (ii) there is available in [the] State substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. '33 Emergency jurisdiction occurs when "the child is physically
present in [the] State and (1) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary
in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or
dependent]. 34 Finally, a state has vacuum jurisdiction to hear a child custody
dispute when no other state meets the prerequisites of any of the three previous
bases for jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, or a state which has
jurisdiction under one of those three bases has declined to exercise its
jurisdiction because it feels that the state exercising vacuum jurisdiction is the
more appropriate forum 3and
it is in the best interests of the child for that state to
5
hear the custody dispute.
Another major aspect of the UCCJA is its provision for the resolution of
simultaneous custody proceedings in multiple states. The UCCJA addresses the
problem of multi-state custody disputes by prohibiting a court from exercising
jurisdiction under the UCCJA if a custody dispute over the same child is
pending in another state that also has jurisdiction under the UCCJA.36 A court is
able to determine whether a custody proceeding is pending in another state
because the UCCJA requires each party to a custody dispute to indicate that it
has participated in or knows of a pending, ongoing, or resolved custody dispute
hearing involving the child in question in the first pleading or an attached
affidavit.3 7 A court may also consult the Out-of-State Custody Decrees and
Proceedings Registry, which every district or family court that hears child
custody disputes must create under the UCCJA.38 If a court proceeds with a child

31. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a). 9 U.L.A. 307-08 (1999).
32. Id. § 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 307.
33. Id. § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 307.
34. Id. § 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 307.
35. Id. § 3(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 307-08.
36. See id § 6(a), 9 U.L.A. 474.
37. Id. §§ 6(b), 9, 9 U.L.A. 474 75, 544-45.
38. See id. at § 16. 9 U.L.A. 625-26.
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custody hearing and, during the proceeding or after making its decree, it
discovers a child custody hearing was pending in another state before it assumed
jurisdiction, that court must immediately contact the other state's court.3 9 The
courts must then determine which
is the more appropriate forum for that
40
particular child custody dispute.
Finally, the UCCJA provides that a court must recognize and enforce a child
custody decree of another state that had jurisdiction to make that decree in
accordance with section 3 of the UCCJA. 4' A court also cannot modify another
state's custody decree unless it finds that the original state no longer has
jurisdiction under section 3 of the UCCJA and the state seeking jurisdiction does
have jurisdiction. 42 These provisions help prevent multi-state custody disputes
by prohibiting a court that did not make the initial custody decree from
modifying the initial decree unless the court seeking jurisdiction finds that the
original court no longer has jurisdiction under the UCCJA. This forces a court
that comes to the matter second in time to recognize that the original court has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its child custody decree, unless the
original court no longer satisfies any of the jurisdictional bases of section 3.
3.

Problems with the UCCJA

While the three preceding aspects of the UCCJA help prevent parental
kidnapping and multi-state custody disputes and protect the best interests of
children, the problems supposedly eliminated by the UCCJA still exist because
of several flaws in the UCCJA. These flaws include its lack of a full faith and
credit clause, its failure to prioritize its four types of child custody jurisdiction,
and its failure to provide enforcement mechanisms.
The biggest loophole in the UCCJA is its lack of a requirement that states
give full faith and credit to another state's child custody decree. As noted above,
section 13 of the UCCJA states that a court must recognize and enforce another
state's custody decree.43 While this may sound like a full faith and credit clause,
section 14 undermines this effect by allowing a second-in-time court to modify a
custody decree if it determines it has jurisdiction under the UCCJA and the
original court no longer does. 44 Because the second-in-time court decides
whether the original court still has jurisdiction, section 14 gives a subsequent
court ample room to find that the original court no longer has jurisdiction. For
example, suppose a court in state X entered the initial child custody decree
because it had home state jurisdiction, then the child moves to state Y and six

39. Id. § 60, 9 U.L.A. 475.

40. Id.
41. See id § 13, 9 U.L.A. 559.
42. Id. § 14(a), 9 U.L.A. 580.
43. Id. § 13, 9 U.L.A. 559.

44. Id. § 14, 9 U.L.A. 580.
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months later state Y has home state jurisdiction.45 If a party wants to modify the
initial decree and files in a court in state Y,the state Ycourt may find that state X
no longer has jurisdiction and that state Y will have jurisdiction to modify the
initial custody decree, when in fact state X has significant connection
jurisdiction.46 This results in two states having concurrent UCCJA jurisdiction
and thus creates a multi-state custody dispute, a problem the UCCJA tried to
eliminate.47
Another major problem with the UCCJA is its failure to prioritize its four
types of child custody jurisdiction. Thus, a state with one type of child custody
jurisdiction has no guidance on whether its type of jurisdiction trumps another
state's type of child custody jurisdiction. The comment to section 3 states that
the first two types of jurisdiction home state and significant connection-are
the two main bases for child custody jurisdiction, but the comment does not
indicate which basis for jurisdiction has priority.48 The comment even states that
these two types of jurisdiction are equal alternatives: "In the first place, a court
in the child's home state has jurisdiction, and secondly, if there is no home state
or the child and hisfamily have equal or strongerties with anotherstate, a court
in that state has jurisdiction."49 This failure to clearly prioritize the types of child
custody jurisdiction allows multi-state disputes to persist. For example, in many
cases, two states have concurrent original jurisdiction because one state is the
home state of the child and the other has significant connection jurisdiction. In
these situations, the UCCJA gives no guidance as to which type of jurisdiction
controls; instead, the courts must determine which state is the more appropriate
forum under the limited guidance of sections 6 and 7 of the UCCJA.5" This
dilemma occurred in P.C. & J.H.v. C.C. (In re interest ofA.E.H.),51 where both
California and Wisconsin claimed jurisdiction over the child custody hearing. 2
Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Wisconsin, which had
significant connection jurisdiction, was the more appropriate forum under the
UCCJA, even though California was the child's home state. 3
Finally, while the UCCJA requires that all states recognize and enforce

45. See, e.g.. Knoth v. Knoth, 297 S.C. 460, 461-62. 377 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1989) (describing how
a South Carolina court made the initial child custody decree, but an Illinois court ignored the fact that
South Carolina still had exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJA and attempted to modify the custody
decree anyway).
46. See id.
at 462-63, 377 S.E.2d at 342 (noting many states that became a child's new home state
have failed to defer to the original decree state); Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC s ofthe UCCJEA: Interstate
Child-Custody PracticeUnder the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267,281 (1998) (noting that the UCCJA has
resulted injurisdictional conflicts between a child's new home state and the original decree state which
later has significant connection jurisdiction).
47. Hoff, supra note 46, at 281.
48. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 308 09 (1999).
49. Id.§ 3 cmt.. 9 U.L.A. 308 (emphasis added).
50. 9 U.L.A 474-75, 497-99.
51. 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1991).
52. See id at 203.
53. Id. at 203-05.
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another state's custody decree, it does not provide how such enforcement is to
proceed. This lack of enforcement procedures or mechanisms has led to different
enforcement procedures evolving in each state, thus limiting the uniform
application of the UCCJA.54 This lack of uniformity complicates the problem of
enforcement and hurts a parent trying to enforce a custody decree in three ways.
First, it may increase litigation costs because the parent seeking enforcement
may need to hire two lawyers-one in the original jurisdiction state and one in
the state where the parent seeks enforcement. 5 Second, it unnecessarily extends
the enforcement process and delays performance of the custody decree by
another state: "A parent opposed to the provisions of a visitation determination
may be able to delay implementation for many months, possibly even years,
thereby frustrating not only the other parent, but also the process that led to the
issuance of the original court order., 5 6 Third, it decreases the certainty of the
outcome.5 7 For example, in Custody of Brandon,58 a divorced couple agreed to
modify their child custody decree, originally created by a Mississippi court,
before the mother moved to Massachusetts with their son, giving the father, a
resident of Mississippi, more expansive visitation rights.59 However, once in
Massachusetts, the mother prevented the father from visiting their son, and the
father initiated a contempt proceeding in Mississippi to enforce the modified
custody decree.6 ° The Mississippi court cited the mother for contempt, but a
Massachusetts court rejected the contempt order as an enforcement mechanism,
finding that a contempt order was not a custody order because it did not affect
the custodial rights of the mother or the visitation rights of the father.6 Thus, in
Custody of Brandon, the lack of uniform enforcement procedures under the
UCCJA hurt the child's father. Although Mississippi's enforcement mechanism
was a contempt citation, the Massachusetts court did not recognize it as a valid
means of enforcing a custody decree, rendering it worthless to the father in terms
of enforcing his visitation rights with his son.
B. ParentalKidnappingPreventionAct
Congress passed the PKPA in 1980 under its Full Faith and Credit and
Commerce Clause powers62 in response to the continuing problems of parental

54. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT prefatory n.. 9 U.L.A. 652
(1999).
55. Id.
56. Id 9 U.L.A. 652-53.
57. Id. 9 U.L.A. 652.
58. 551 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. 1990).
59. Id. at 507.
60. See id
61.Id. at 510.
62. Gloria Folger DeHart, Comity, Conventions, andthe Constitution. State andFederalInitiatives
in InternationalSupport Enforcement. 28 FAM. L.Q. 89, 106 (1994).
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child snatching and multi-state custody disputes.63 Although the creation of the
UCCJA and its adoption by many states alleviated these two problems,64 the
problems persisted because of various loopholes in the UCCJA and because not
every state had passed the UCCJA by 1980.65 The PKPA, as a federal statute, is
binding on all states, but a state must adopt the UCCJA before it becomes the
law of that state. Thus, the PKPA supplemented the UCCJA in states that had
already adopted the UCCJA,66 and it made the key provisions of the UCCJA that
the PKPA adopted and clarified the law in states that had not yet adopted the
UCCJA. The PKPA filled in the loopholes in the UCCJA in three significant
ways: the PKPA requires states to give another state's child custody decrees full
faith and credit; it provides continuing and exclusive child custody jurisdiction
to the state which made the original child custody decree; and it expressly
67
prioritizes home state jurisdiction over significant connection jurisdiction.
The PKPA's most important contribution to the area of child custody
jurisdiction is its full faith and credit provision: "The appropriate authorities of
every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify .. .any
custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the
provisions of this section by a court of another State."68 This provision is
significantly more effective than the UCCJA's full faith and credit provision.
While the PKPA, like the UCCJA, provides that a state may not modify another
state's custody decree, the PKPA expressly provides that a state may modify
another state's custody decree only if the original state's continuing jurisdiction
is no longer valid or that state has declined to exercise its continuing
jurisdiction.69 This provision for continuing jurisdiction is a vast improvement
over UCCJA section 13 because while UCCJA section 14 enables a second court
to modify the original custody decree, the PKPA provides that an original court
retains jurisdiction and only that court can modify the original custody decree as

63. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7. 94 Stat. 3566. 3568-69
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (2000) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of
Purpose)).
64. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child CustodyJurisdictionandTerritoriality,52 OHIO ST.L.J. 369,
369 n.4 (1991).
65. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT bl., 9 U.L.A.261-62 (1999).
66. Note that the PKPA does not preempt the UCCJA in states that have adopted the UCCJA;
instead, the PKPA merely supplements the UCCJA. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Child
Custody JurisdictionandProcedure,35 EMORY L.J. 291, 339 (1986) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause does
not require federal preemption in the child custody setting; the PKPA and the various state UCCJAs
function in a correlative and complementary fashion.").
67. § 8, 94 Stat. at 3569-71 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). C. (d) (2000)).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (2000). See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (containing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 82 (1988) (opining that Congress's
goal in enacting the PKPA was to extend the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody disputes from the
context in which Congress enacted the PKPA, i.e., the problems of interstate child kidnapping and
jurisdictional confrontations among the states in custody cases).
69. § 8, 94 Stat. at 3570 71 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d), (f) (2000)).
70. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 580 (1999); see supra notes 43-47
and accompanying text.
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long as the child or any of the parties to the custody proceeding still reside in the
original court's state.7' The PKPA's combination of a full faith and credit
requirement and a continuing jurisdiction provision make recognition and
enforcement of decrees by other states more uniform, more predictable, and also
more likely than recognition and enforcement under the UCCJA alone. The
provisions also greatly reduce the effectiveness of parental kidnapping in giving
the snatching parent a favorable custody decree, helping to eliminate the
unsavory practice of parental child snatching as an option for a parent unhappy
with a current child custody decree.
The PKPA also prioritizes home state jurisdiction over significant
connection jurisdiction, clarifying which state is the more appropriate forum
when more than one state has jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding.72
This clarification resolves the problem where two or more states have concurrent
jurisdiction over a child custody hearing and cannot agree on which state is the
more appropriate forum under UCCJA section 6. By favoring home state
jurisdiction over significant connection jurisdiction, the PKPA immediately
resolves any concurrent jurisdiction problems because only one state can be a
child's home state at a certain time, and that state always trumps another state
that has only significant connection jurisdiction. This is effective because it
eliminates the need for the various courts to argue about which one is the most
appropriate forum, saving judicial resources and more quickly resolving the
custody dispute, which is in the best interest of the child.
C. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdictionand Enforcement Act
Roughly thirty years after creating the UCCJA and in reaction to the
loopholes and inconsistencies the various state versions of the UCCJA created,
NCCUSL drafted the UCCJEA in 1997, an updated version of the UCCJA.74
NCCUSL was concerned that the combination of the UCCJA and the PKPA,
while effective, was not foolproof and had resulted in a lack of uniformity
among the states with respect to child custody hearings.
According to NCCUSL, the UCCJEA has two specific purposes. First, it
incorporates elements of the PKPA into the child custody jurisdiction provisions
of the UCCJA. 76 The UCCJEA also takes into consideration the UCCJA's result

71. Compare UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 13, 9 U.L.A. 580 (1999) (allowing a
court to determine whether it hasjurisdiction to modify a custody decree issued in an other state), with
§ 8(d), 94 Stat. at 3570-71 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (2000)) (mandating that an original state
retains jurisdiction over its child custody or visitation determination).
72. § 8(c)(2), 94 Stat. at 3570 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (2000)).
73. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
74. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, prefatory n.. 9 U.L.A. 649-50
(1999).
75. Id. at 650.
76. Id.
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of "almost thirty years of inconsistent case law."' 7 7 To rectify that situation, the
UCCJEA provides standards clarifying "which states can exercise original
jurisdiction over a child custody determination," how a state's continuing
jurisdiction operates, and when and how states can use modification
jurisdiction.78 Second, the UCCJEA provides mechanisms for enforcing
interstate child custody and visitation determinations. In accomplishing these
two purposes, the UCCJEA brings uniformity and consistency to child custody
determinations and the enforcement of such determinations.8 ° However, the
UCCJEA still has the same goals as the PKPA and the UCCJA-to eliminate
parental kidnapping and multi-state custody disputes.8
There are several major aspects of the UCCJEA. First, the UCCJEA
incorporates the PKPA's prioritization of home state jurisdiction into its
categorization and description of the four major bases for child custody
jurisdiction.82 Second, it incorporates the PKPA's full faith and credit clause.83
Third, it explicitly provides for the exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of the
court that made the original custody decree, as already provided for in the
PKPA.84 However, the NCCUSL modified continuing jurisdiction: the state that
made the original custody decree determines whether it has continuing
jurisdiction, rather than the state that is looking to modify the decree.85 Unlike
the UCCJA, the UCCJEA provides, "The modification State is not authorized to
determine that the original decree State has lost its jurisdiction."86 Thus, the
UCCJEA employs a stronger version of the PKPA's full faith and credit clause
by strengthening the exclusivity of continuing jurisdiction.
Finally, the UCCJEA provides actual enforcement procedures, thereby
unifying enforcement procedures among all the states that adopt the UCCJEA.8
NCCUSL recognized the problems a parent who leaves the state that issued the
original custody decree faces in enforcing and preventing an adverse

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also id. § 401. 9 U.L.A. 705 (requiring courts consider "the need to promote
uniformity" when construing the UCCJEA).
81. See id § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 657.
82. Id. § 201 (a), 9 U.L.A. 671; see Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96611, § 8(c)(2), 94 Stat. 3566, 3570 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (2000))
(establishing the priority of home state jurisdiction).
83. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 313, 9 U.L.A. 700; see
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act § 8(a), 94 Stat. at 3569 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738(a) (2000)) (mandating courts enforce custody decrees of other states).
84. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT §§ 202,206.9 U.L.A. 673-74,
680 8 1; see Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act § 8(d), 94 Stat. at 3570 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (2000)) (granting the original court issuing a custody decree exclusive and
continuing jurisdiction over that decree).
85. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT §§ 202(a)(1), 203(1). 9 U.L.A.
673, 676 (1999).
86. Id. § 203 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 676.
87.Id. §§ 301-317. 9 U.L.A. 689-704.
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modification of the decree in another state. 8 Thus, NCCUSL created several
options for the enforcement of custody decrees, beginning with a custody
registration process.8 9 The UCCJA also provided for the creation of the Out-ofState Custody Decrees and Proceedings Registry, but the UCCJEA employs a
much simpler registration 9° and provides a way for a parent moving to another
state to predetermine if the new state will enforce the custody decree. 9' By
asking a court to register another state's custody decree, the petitioner is asking
that court to recognize and enforce that decree. The court must file the decree as
if the decree was a foreign judgment and give notice of the registration to any
parent, or person acting as a parent, of the child in question. 92 The parent
receiving notice of the registration who wishes to contest must contest the
registration within twenty days after service of notice, and the registration will
be upheld unless the following occurs: (1) the original court did not have proper
child custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; (2) a court with proper child
custody jurisdiction properly vacated or modified the child custody decree; or
(3) the contesting parent did not receive proper notice."3 Once a court has
registered a decree, it can no longer be contested, 94 and a new state will
recognize and enforce a registered decree as if that state had issued the decree.
95
Thus, the new state's remedies for enforcing a custody decree will apply.
While the remedies may vary from state to state, the UCCJEA employs a
uniform method for having a custody decree enforced, enabling uniform
enforcement throughout the country.
The next option for enforcement under the UCCJEA arises where a
visitation order has been violated. Here a court may make a temporary order
enforcing or modifying visitation schedules or provisions a court in another state
created. 96 This provision authorizes a court without modification jurisdiction to
issue a temporary order enforcing visitation rights if necessary.9 However, such
a court may not provide for a permanent change in visitation; a party requesting
a permanent change of the visitation schedule or provisions must make the
request to the original court if the court still has continuing jurisdiction under
section 202, or to a court which has modification jurisdiction under section
203.9'
A final option for enforcement under the UCCJEA is expedited
enforcement, which is used when a parent unlawfully keeps a child from the

88. Id. prefatory n., 9 U.L.A. 652.
89. Id. § 305, 9 U.L.A. 692 93.
90. Stoner, supra note 8, at 320 21.
91. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT

§

305 cmt.. 9 U.L.A. 693

(1999).
92. See id § 305(b), 9 U.L.A. 692.

93. Id. § 305(d).
94. Id. § 305(f). 9 U.L.A. 693.

95. See id §§ 303. 306, 9 U.L.A. 690, 693.
96. Id. § 304(a), 9 U.L.A. 691.

97. Id. § 304 cmt.
98. Id.
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parent who is awarded custody.99 The goal of expedited enforcement is to have
the child physically produced to the court so the court can return the child to the
parent who is awarded custody. 1°° In this critical situation, a court will order the
parent who took the child to physically produce the child and pay the fees, costs,
and expenses of the enforcement hearing.' The court may also grant any other
requested remedies against the kidnapping parent if appropriate, unless the
parent who took the child can show that the custody decree was never registered
in that state as well as one of the following: (1) the original court did not have
proper child custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; (2) a court with proper
child custody jurisdiction properly vacated or modified the custody decree; or
(3) the contesting parent did not receive proper notice. 10 2 Another significant
aspect of expedited enforcement is that, if necessary, law enforcement and
public officials can become involved.'0 3 A court may issue a warrant for law
enforcement officials to take physical custody of a child if it finds a child is
likely to suffer imminent physical harm or be removed from the state. °4 A law
enforcement officer or public official, such as a prosecutor, also may take action
to have a custody decree enforced and will be deemed to have acted on behalf of
the court.' NCCUSL provided for the involvement of public authorities in
enforcing custody decrees because it felt their involvement would "encourage
the parties to abide by the terms of the court order."'0 6
In summary, the UCCJEA harmonizes the UCCJA and the PKPA by
combining and clarifying their provisions. The UCCJEA also creates actual
enforcement procedures, giving support to the UCCJA's and PKPA's
recognition and enforcement provisions and making such procedures uniform
throughout the country. In addition, the UCCJEA carries on and furthers the
goals of the UCCJA and the PKPA by improving these two acts, ultimately
helping to realize the major goal of serving the best interests of the children at
the heart of these child custody decrees.'0°

99. See id.
prefatory n., 9 U.L.A. 653.
100. Id.§ 308 cmt.
101. Id.§ 312(a), 9 U.L.A. 699.
102. Id. §§ 308(d). 310(a). 9 U.L.A. 695. 696-97.
103. Id. §§ 311,315,316. 9 U.L.A. 698. 701, 703.
104. Id.§ 311 (b), 9 U.L.A. 698.
105. Id.§§ 315, 316, 9 U.L.A. 701,703.
106. Id. § 315 cmt.. 9 U.L.A. 702.
107. While the ultimate goal of all three of these acts is to serve the best interests of the children
involved in custody battles, NCCUSL removed this goal from the UCCJEA's list of purposes because
NCCUSL wanted to clearly distinguish substantive goals servingthe best interests of children from
the jurisdictional goals the NCCUSL designed the UCCJEA to serve. Id. prefatory n. 9 U.L.A. 652.
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UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AND THE UNIFORM CHILD

CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

South Carolina'sUniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct

In 1981 South Carolina enacted the SCUCCJA, adopting almost the exact
language of the UCCJA.'0 8 However, despite the matching language of the
UCCJA and the SCUCCJA, South Carolina has mostly avoided the problems the
UCCJA has caused in the rest of the country. South Carolina case law
addressing the SCUCCJA already prioritizes home state jurisdiction over
significant connection jurisdiction, provides for exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction, and gives full faith and credit to another state's custody decrees if
made in conformity with the UCCJA or similar provisions.
A major South Carolina child custody jurisdiction case embodying these
progressive aspects of the SCUCCJA is Sinclair v. Albrecht.'0 9 In Sinclair, the
Albrechts lived in New Hampshire with their daughter and two children from the
mother's previous marriage. 1 0 The Albrechts separated in 1981, with the father
moving to Texas and the mother moving to South Carolina with the children. 1'
The Albrechts' divorce was finalized in 1983, granting the mother custody of the
children and the father visitation rights." 2 In late 1982, the mother became
seriously ill.' 13 As a result, the children's maternal grandmother initiated a
custody action in South Carolina to prevent the father from taking the two
younger children back with him to Texas." 4 Despite the father's objections, the
Sinclair court affirmed the family court's finding that New Hampshire no longer
had exclusive continuing jurisdiction under the SCUCCJA because neither
parent nor any of the children lived there anymore." 5 The Sinclair court held
South Carolina was the proper forum for the child
custody proceeding because
116
South Carolina was now the child's home state.
Sinclair established two principles of child custody jurisdiction not
specifically provided for in the SCUCCJA, thereby filling the loopholes in the
SCUCCJA. First, the Sinclair court held that, although more than one state may
have jurisdiction under the SCUCCJA, once a state court has issued a custody
decree, the decree state has exclusive continuing jurisdiction as long as one

108. Act of July 1, 1981, No. 102, 1981 S.C. Acts 351. The SCUCCJA is virtually identical to the
original UCCJA. The only differences are that the SCUCCJA omits UCCJA §§ 25, 27. 28. and the
SCUCCJA adds that South Carolina Family Courts are usually the forum for enforcing and litigating
the SCUCCJA. Compare UNIT. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ I 28,9 U.L.A. 271 647(1999),
with S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (1976).
109. 287 S.C. 20, 336 S.E.2d 485 (Ct. App. 1985).
110. Id. at21, 336 S.E.2d at 486.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21, 22, 336 S.E.2d at 486, 487.
116. Id. at 24. 336 S.E.2d at 488.
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parent continues to live in that state." 17 This total acceptance of exclusive
continuing jurisdiction reflects South Carolina's commitment to the SCUCCJA's
goal of preventing multi-state custody disputes by giving full faith and credit to
another state's custody decree unless neither parent resides in the original state.
Second, the Sinclair court held that South Carolina had priority in terms of
having jurisdiction to modify the original custody decree because South
Carolina had home state jurisdiction over the children." 8 As this case
demonstrates, the SCUCCJA and South Carolina case law on child custody
jurisdiction already fill loopholes of the SCUCCJA. Therefore, adopting the
UCCJEA in South Carolina will be a simple transition, codifying the law already
existing in South Carolina.
B.

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as
Proposed in South Carolinaand Its Effects on South Carolina

As proposed, South Carolina's version of the UCCJEA (SCUCCJEA) is
virtually identical to NCCUSL's UCCJEA and accomplishes the same major
goals and purposes." 9 Thus, the distinctions between the SCUCCJA and the
proposed SCUCCJEA compare similarly to the UCCJA and the UCCJEA, as
seen in the Appendix. Thus, the best way to demonstrate how adopting the
SCUCCJEA will do little but codify current South Carolina case law and
statutory law is to analyze a major South Carolina child custody jurisdiction case
under the SCUCCJA and then under the SCUCCJEA.
In Charest v. Charest,12 ° the Charests married in 1975 and lived in South
Carolina until they divorced in August 1991.21 After the divorce, the mother
assumed custody of their three adopted children and moved with them to New
York.'22 In July 1996, the father brought an action in South Carolina for a
change of custody, "alleging the children were being worked like 'indentured
servants' on the mother's 145-acre farm; that she kept farm animals in the home,
endangering the health of the children; and that she had physically abused the
children."' 23 The family court granted the father temporary emergency custody
pending a custody modification hearing. 2 4 The mother filed a motion to
reconsider, asserting that under the UCCJA the action should be heard in New
York because New York had been the children's home state for the past five

117. Id. at 23. 336 S.E.2d at 487.
118. Id.at 24, 336 S.E.2d at 488.
119. The SCUCCJEA, as proposed. is virtually identical to the original UCCJEA. Compare UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 101-405. 9 U.L.A. 657-706 (1999). with S. 13. 117th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2007), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/sessl 17_20072008/bills/13.htm.
120. 329 S.C. 511, 495 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997).
121. Id. at 514. 495 S.E.2d at 785.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 514, 495 S.E.2d at 785 86.
124. Id. at 514. 495 S.E.2d at 786.
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years. 12 5 At the hearing, the family court agreed with the mother and held New
York was the more appropriate forum because it was the home state of the
children.' 26 The state court of appeals affirmed for several reasons. First, the
court held that, even though more than one state may meet the SCUCCJA's
jurisdictional requirements for modifying a custody decree, the original decree
state had exclusive continuing jurisdiction while one parent still resided in that
state, even if the children had moved to another state.'27 Thus, because South
Carolina was the decree state and the father still resided in South Carolina, the
Charest court held South Carolina had exclusive continuing jurisdiction to
modify the custody decree.' 28 However, the court noted that under the
SCUCCJA a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction to hear a custody
proceeding if it finds itself to be an inconvenient forum in comparison to another
forum and if a proceeding is promptly initiated in that other forum. 2 9 The
Charest court found that New York was a more appropriate forum than South
Carolina because New York had been the children's home state for several
years, even though South Carolina 130had continuing jurisdiction because one
parent still resided in South Carolina.
Under the proposed SCUCCJEA, Charest would probably come out exactly
the same way. This case upholds the principle of exclusive continuing
jurisdiction, which is provided for in the proposed SCUCCJEA. 13 1 The
SCUCCJEA also recognizes that a court with jurisdiction to hear a child custody
proceeding may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds another state court
is the more appropriate forum, but only if a proceeding is initiated in that other
state. 132 Finally, the SCUCCJEA, like the PKPA, recognizes that a state with
home state jurisdiction has priority over a state with significant connection
jurisdiction. 33 Applying both the SCUCCJA and the SCUCCJEA to Charest
clearly demonstrates that adopting the SCUCCJEA would change little, simply
codifying current South Carolina law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The General

Assembly

should press the proposed

version of the

125. Id. at 514 15, 495 S.E.2d at 786.
126. See id. at 515. 495 S.E.2d at 786.
127. Id. at 518. 495 S.E.2d at 788.
128. Id. at 518 19, 495 S.E.2d at 788 (citing Knoth v. Knoth, 297 S.C. 460, 463 64, 377 S.E.2d
340, 342 (1989); Sinclair v. Albrecht, 287 S.C. 20, 23, 336 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ct. App. 1985)).
129. Id. at 519, 495 S.E.2d at 788: accord S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-796(a) (1976) (providing that

a court may decline jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding where another forum is more
convenient).
130. Id. at 520 21, 495 S.E.2d at 789.
131. S. 13, 117th Gen. Assem.. sec. 1, § 20-7-6032 (S.C. 2007), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess117 2007-2008/bills/13.htm.
132. Id. § 20-7-6042©0.
133. Id. § 20-7-6030; Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 8(c)(2),
94 Stat. 3566. 3570 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (2000)).
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SCUCCJEA as soon as possible. The SCUCCJEA will not make any serious
modification to current South Carolina law on child custody jurisdiction because
it codifies, in effect, current South Carolina law. As a result, the General
Assembly's research on the potential effects of the SCUCCJEA should be
minimal. Also, passing the SCUCCJEA will improve and clarify the SCUCCJA
by codifying South Carolina case law on child custody jurisdiction and bring
South Carolina in line with most of the country. Finally, passing the SCUCCJEA
serves the overarching purpose of child custody jurisdiction, which is to serve
the best interests of children involved in custody disputes, a purpose for which
state legislators and their constituents can hardly object.
Amy M. Palesch
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